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liability are common in § 19831 litigation.  The purpose of this pres-
entation is to examine two recent Supreme Court decisions, Connick 
v. Thompson2 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
3
 with an eye to their impact on 
how lower federal courts will assess such claims in the wake of new 
constraints imposed by these cases.  The focus of the discussion will 
be on developments in single-incident liability cases after Connick 
and supervisory liability claims after Iqbal. 
II. THE DEMISE OF SINGLE INCIDENT LIABILITY 
A. City of Canton v. Harris 
In City of Canton v. Harris,4 the Court determined what 
would make a government entity liable for an admitted violation of 
the Constitution by a non-policymaking employee.5  In City of Can-
ton, the respondent, Geraldine Harris, was arrested and brought to a 
police station.6  Mrs. Harris displayed signs requiring medical atten-
tion.7  On several occasions she slumped to the ground and fell, but 
instead of giving her medical support, the jail personnel “left [her] ly-
ing on the floor to prevent her from falling again.”8  She was asked, 
but incoherently responded, as to whether she required medical atten-
tion.9  Eventually, when she was released, her family provided her 
with medical support.10 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, it was con-
ceded that there was an underlying Fourteenth Amendment11 consti-
tutional violation.12  Specifically, Mrs. Harris, as a pre-trial detainee, 
was deprived of necessary medical attention.13  The question raised 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
2 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
3 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
4 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
5 Id. at 380. 
6 Id. at 381. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 381. 
10 Id. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
12 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8. 
13 See id. (“First, petitioner has conceded that, as the case comes to us, we must assume 
that respondent‟s constitutional right to receive medical care was denied by city 
employees—whatever the nature of that right might be.” (citing Transcript of Oral Argument 
2
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was what must the respondent prove in order to hold the City of Can-
ton liable for the underlying constitutional violation?14  In City of 
Canton, the Court unanimously rejected the City‟s argument that mu-
nicipal liability can be imposed only where the challenged policy is 
itself unconstitutional and concluded that “there are limited circums-
tances in which an allegation of a „failure to train‟ can be the basis for 
liability under § 1983.”15  Noting substantial disagreement among the 
lower courts as to the level of culpability required in “failure to train” 
cases, the Court went on to hold that “the inadequacy of police train-
ing may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure 
to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 
with whom the police come into contact.”16  The City of Canton “de-
liberate indifference” standard is based on a construction of the 
§ 1983 causation language, and it is clear that the statutory standard 
has nothing to do with the level of culpability that may be required to 
make out the underlying constitutional wrong.17  The Court in City of 
Canton decided that deliberate indifference is what is required to es-
tablish the municipal policy as the “moving force” behind or cause of 
the constitutional violation.18  As the Court later explained, the “term 
was used in the [City of] Canton case for the . . . purpose of identify-
ing the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional 
torts committed by its inadequately trained agents.”19 
The Court indicated two ways the plaintiff may show the re-
quisite objective deliberate indifference in order to establish munici-
pal liability in a failure-to-train case.  First, a plaintiff may establish 
deliberate indifference by demonstrating a failure to train officers in a 
specific area where there is an obvious need for training to avoid vi-
olations of citizens‟ constitutional rights.20  The Court noted the fol-
lowing: 
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to 
specific officers or employees the need for more or 
 
at 8-9, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-
1989/1988/1988_86_1088#argument)). 
14 Id. at 383. 
15 Id. at 387. 
16 Id. at 388. 
17 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 n.8. 
18 Id. at 388 (quoting Monell v. Dep‟t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
19 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992). 
20 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. 
3
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different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, 
that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be 
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.21 
The example all of the Justices agreed would demonstrate “deliberate 
indifference,” is where city policymakers provide no training on the 
constitutional limits of the use of deadly force to armed police offic-
ers who are given authority to arrest fleeing felons.22  Without train-
ing, officers will likely commit constitutional violations and a pattern 
is not needed to establish the deliberate indifference of the city in 
failing to train where the outcome of no training is so predictable and 
obvious.  Second, as Justice O‟Connor suggested in her partial con-
currence, a plaintiff may rely on a pattern of unconstitutional conduct 
that is so pervasive as to imply actual or constructive knowledge on 
the part of policymakers, whose deliberate indifference, evidenced by 
a failure to correct once the need for training became obvious, would 
be attributable to the municipality.23  Both of these methods, the ob-
viousness method and the constructive notice method, are discussed 
in Sornberger v. City of Knoxville.24 
B. Board of County Commissioners v. Brown 
In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,25 the Supreme 
Court revisited the issue of municipal liability under § 1983 in the 
context of a single bad hiring decision made by a county sheriff who 
was stipulated to be the final policymaker for the county in matters of 
law enforcement.26  Specifically, the sheriff hired his nephew‟s son, 
Burns, for the position of reserve deputy.27  In addition to having no 
training,28 Burns had a criminal record consisting of various traffic 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 390 n.10. 
23 Id. at 396 (O‟Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
24 434 F.3d 1006, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 2006). 
25 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
26 Id. at 402. 
27 Id. at 401. 
28 Brown did not go to the Supreme Court on the issue of failure to train, but, on remand, 
the Fifth Circuit reinstated the jury verdict for the plaintiff on the failure to train claim.  Id. at 
402.  The Fifth Circuit held that because Deputy Burns did not receive any training where 
there was an obvious need to train, a single incident could result in county liability.  Brown 
v. Bryan Cnty., 219 F.3d 450, 465 (5th Cir. 2000). 
4
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violations and misdemeanors.29  However, because none of the 
crimes were felonies under Oklahoma law, he could not be barred 
from this position.30 
Respondent was injured when she was forcibly extracted from 
a vehicle driven by her husband.31  Mr. Brown was avoiding a police 
checkpoint and was eventually stopped by a squad car in which Re-
serve Deputy Burns was riding.32  Burns removed Mrs. Brown from 
the vehicle with such force that he caused severe injury to her 
knees.33 
Respondent sued both Burns and the county under § 1983.34  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
district court‟s entry of judgment on the jury‟s verdict against Burns 
for excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment.35  The ma-
jority of the panel also affirmed the judgment against the county 
based on Sheriff Moore‟s decision to hire Burns without adequately 
investigating his background.36  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
Moore‟s inadequate screening and hiring of Burns demonstrated “de-
liberate indifference to the public‟s welfare.”37 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice 
O‟Connor, reversed the court of appeals, distinguishing Brown‟s 
case, involving a claim that a single lawful hiring decision ultimately 
resulted in a constitutional violation, from a case “[w]here a plaintiff 
claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or 
directs an employee to do so.”38  As the Court noted, its prior cases, 
recognizing municipal liability based on a single act or decision attri-
buted to the government entity, involved decisions of local legislative 
bodies or policymakers that directly effected or ordered someone to 
effect a constitutional deprivation.39  In such cases, there are no real 
 
29 Brown, 520 U.S. at 401. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 400-01. 
32 Id. at 400. 
33 Id. at 400-01. 
34 Brown, 520 U.S. at 401. 
35 Id. at 402. 
36 Id. 
37 Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 67 F.3d 1174, 1184 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 397 
(1997). 
38 Brown, 520 U.S. at 402-04. 
39 Id. at 403-04.  The Court explained: 
To the extent that we have recognized a cause of action under § 1983 
based on a single decision attributable to a municipality, we have done 
so only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the 
5
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problems with respect to the issues of fault or causation. 
Because the respondent did not allege a pattern of “bad hires” 
in Brown, the argument for county liability was based on Sheriff 
Moore‟s alleged deliberate indifference in failing to investigate 
Burns‟s background.  The theory was that “Burns‟[s] use of excessive 
force was the plainly obvious consequence of Sheriff Moore‟s failure 
to screen Burns‟[s] record.”40  The majority, however, rejected res-
pondent‟s effort to analogize her inadequate screening case to a fail-
ure-to-train case.41  Justice O‟Connor noted: 
In attempting to import the reasoning of [City of] 
Canton into the hiring context, respondent ignores the 
fact that predicting the consequence of a single hiring 
decision, even one based on an inadequate assessment 
of a record, is far more difficult than predicting what 
might flow from the failure to train a single law en-
forcement officer as to a specific skill necessary to the 
discharge of his duties.  As our decision in [City of] 
 
plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and 
causation.  For example, Owen v. Independence and Newport v. Fact 
Concerts, Inc. involved formal decisions of municipal legislative bodies.  
In Owen, the city council allegedly censured and discharged an em-
ployee without a hearing.  In Fact Concerts, the city council canceled a 
license permitting a concert following a dispute over the performance‟s 
content.  Neither decision reflected implementation of a generally appli-
cable rule.  But we did not question that each decision, duly promulgated 
by city lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if the decision itself 
were found to be unconstitutional.  Because fault and causation were ob-
vious in each case, proof that the municipality‟s decision was unconstitu-
tional would suffice to establish that the municipality itself was liable for 
the plaintiff‟s constitutional injury.  Similarly, Pembaur v. Cincinnati 
concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county‟s final 
decisionmaker to direct county deputies to forcibly enter petitioner‟s 
place of business to serve capiases upon third parties.  Relying on Owen 
and Newport, we concluded that a final decisionmaker‟s adoption of a 
course of action “tailored to a particular situation and not intended to 
control decisions in later situations” may, in some circumstances, give 
rise to municipal liability under § 1983.  In Pembaur, it was not disputed 
that the prosecutor had specifically directed the action resulting in the 
deprivation of petitioner‟s rights.  The conclusion that the decision was 
that of a final municipal decision-maker and was therefore properly at-
tributable to the municipality established municipal liability.  No ques-
tions of fault or causation arose. 
Id. at 405-06 (citations omitted). 
40 Id. at 408-09. 
41 Id. at 409. 
6
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Canton makes clear, “deliberate indifference” is a 
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a mu-
nicipal actor disregarded a known or obvious conse-
quence of his action.  Unlike the risk from a particular 
glaring omission in a training regimen, the risk from a 
single instance of inadequate screening of an appli-
cant‟s background is not “obvious” in the abstract; ra-
ther, it depends upon the background of the applicant.  
A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an 
unfit officer will be hired, and that the unfit officer 
will, when placed in a particular position to affect the 
rights of citizens, act improperly.  But that is only a 
generalized showing of risk.  The fact that inadequate 
scrutiny of an applicant‟s background would make a 
violation of rights more likely cannot alone give rise to 
an inference that a policymaker‟s failure to scrutinize 
the record of a particular applicant produced a specific 
constitutional violation.42 
The majority opinion concluded the following: 
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant‟s back-
ground would lead a reasonable policymaker to con-
clude that the plainly obvious consequence of the de-
cision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of 
a third party‟s federally protected right can the offi-
cial‟s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant‟s 
background constitute “deliberate indifference.”43 
Thus, the majority insisted on evidence from which a jury could find 
that had Sheriff Moore adequately screened Deputy Burns‟s back-
ground he “should have concluded that Burns‟[s] use of excessive 
force would be a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring deci-
sion.”44  In the view of the majority, scrutiny of Burns‟s record did 
not produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found 
that Sheriff Moore‟s hiring decision reflected deliberate indifference 
to “an obvious risk” that Burns would use excessive force.45 
 
42 Brown, 520 U.S. at 410-11. 
43 Id. at 411. 
44 Id. at 412-13. 
45 Id. at 415. 
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C. The Connick Decision 
The recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Connick will un-
doubtedly make it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert failure-to-train 
claims based on single-incident violations and a theory of obvious-
ness in the need for training.46  In a 5-to-4 decision, with the majority 
opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court held that Harry Con-
nick, the Orleans Parish District Attorney in Louisiana, could not be 
sued for damages in his official capacity47 for failure to train his 
prosecutors as to Brady obligations.48 
In Connick, John Thompson had been convicted of attempted 
armed robbery and was subsequently convicted of an unrelated mur-
der; he chose not to testify at his murder trial because of the possibili-
ty of impeachment from the robbery conviction.49  “Thompson spent 
eighteen years in prison, including fourteen years on death row,” and 
was one month away from execution when a private investigator 
working on his case “discovered . . . undisclosed evidence from his 
armed robbery trial.”50  As it turned out, a prosecutor on the robbery 
trial had withheld blood-test evidence, which exonerated Thompson 
of the armed robbery and thus infected the murder conviction as 
well.51 
The robbery conviction was vacated and the murder case was 
retried with a jury verdict of not guilty.52  As a result, Thompson 
brought a wrongful conviction suit against the district attorney‟s of-
fice, claiming that by failing to disclose the crime lab report, the dis-
trict attorney‟s office violated Brady v. Maryland.53  Two questions 
were presented in Connick.  First, was this a single incident case?54  
Second, if so, was there sufficient evidence to prove the requisite de-
 
46 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (holding that one Brady violation alone was insufficient 
for a failure-to-train claim). 
47 See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-39 (2009) (granting absolute immun-
ity to prosecutors and supervising attorneys in failure-to-train claims and thereby eliminating 
any possibility of a suit against Connick in his individual capacity for failure-to-train in per-
forming his administrative functions as head of the office). 
48 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (plac-
ing an obligation on a prosecutor to disclose all exculpatory evidence to an accused “irres-
pective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). 
49 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1356. 
52 Id. at 1356-57. 
53 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357. 
54 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360-61. 
8
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liberate indifference standard on the part of the district attorney‟s of-
fice?55  Over a twenty-year period “no fewer than five [different] 
prosecutors” had known about and failed to turn over the exculpatory 
blood-test evidence.56  Indeed, there were ten exhibits disclosed at the 
retrial that had not been disclosed at the initial murder trial.57  The 
majority viewed this egregious conduct over a twenty-year period as 
a “single incident” and, overturning a fourteen-million-dollar verdict 
in Thompson‟s favor, stated that “[f]ailure to train prosecutors in 
their Brady obligations does not fall within the narrow range of Can-
ton‟s hypothesized single-incident liability.”58  The Court distin-
guished prosecutors from police officers in terms of legal education 
and training needs, concluding that “[a] licensed attorney making le-
gal judgments, in his capacity as a prosecutor, about Brady material 
simply does not present the same „highly predictable‟ constitutional 
danger as Canton‟s untrained officer.”59  According to the majority, 
“The reason why the Canton hypothetical is inapplicable is that attor-
neys, unlike police officers, are equipped with the tools to find, in-
terpret, and apply legal principles.”60  The majority underscored that 
“[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained em-
ployees is „ordinarily necessary‟ to demonstrate deliberate indiffe-
rence for purposes of failure to train”61 and observed that none of the 
four convictions that had been overturned due to Brady violations in 
the ten-year period prior to Thompson‟s robbery trial had “involved 
failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or 
scientific evidence of any kind,” and thus, none could have put Con-
nick on notice as to the need for specific training to avoid the consti-
tutional violation in Thompson‟s case.62 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a strong dissent, which she read from 
the bench.63  The dissenters saw the Brady violations in Thompson‟s 
case as “not singular” and “not aberrational,” but rather “just what 
one would expect given the attitude toward Brady pervasive in the 
District Attorney‟s Office.”64  Justice Ginsburg concluded that if 
 
55 Id. at 1361. 
56 Id. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 1376. 
58 Id. at 1361 (majority opinion). 
59 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-63. 
60 Id. at 1364. 
61 Id. at 1360 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
64 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1384. 
9
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prosecutors were not trained about Brady, it is foreseeable that con-
duct like this would occur, and by not training its prosecutors, the dis-
trict attorney‟s office was deliberately indifferent to “a legal require-
ment fundamental to a fair trial.”65 
D. Cases Post-Connick 
After deciding Connick, the Court granted certiorari in Conn 
v. City of Reno66 and vacated and remanded in light of                 
Connick.67  Following a suicide in jail, the Ninth Circuit found that 
failing to adopt and implement policies on suicide prevention estab-
lished deliberate indifference.68  On remand, the district court‟s grant 
of summary judgment for the city was reinstated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.69  Other post-Connick cases also signal a tougher hurdle for 
plaintiffs in establishing liability based on the Canton single-incident 
theory. 
1. Craig v. Floyd County 
In Craig v. Floyd County,70 there appeared to be some disa-
greement as to whether the injury to plaintiff was the result of a sin-
gle incident.  Craig was tasered and fell to the ground in a pool of his 
own blood.71  He was detained for nine days in jail and received six-
teen health evaluations from nine different employees of the Georgia 
Correctional System before he got a CT scan, which indicated he re-
quired neurological surgery.72  The majority stated that this was a 
single incident and one that was insufficient to establish deliberate 
indifference.73  The concurring opinion questioned whether it was a 
single incident when there was multiple employees involved includ-
ing nine different employees and sixteen evaluations.74 
Litigants may find that the facts of a case often present a 
question about whether the case will be viewed as a single-incident 
 
65 Id. 
66 591 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2010). 
67 City of Reno v. Conn, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011). 
68 Conn, 591 F.3d at 1105. 
69 Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). 
70 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). 
71 Id. at 1308. 
72 Id. at 1309. 
73 Id. at 1311. 
74 Id. at 1312-13 (Cox, J., concurring). 
10
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situation or not.  Unless plaintiffs have a case where the need for 
training is plainly obvious, it would behoove plaintiffs to look for a 
pattern of incidents, in addition to their own, that would have put po-
licymakers on notice of a problem.  Defendants, of course, should 
raise the “single-incident flag” whenever they can and argue that 
there was no obvious need to train absent a pattern of constitutional 
violations. 
2. Cash v. County of Erie 
In Cash v. County of Erie,75 the plaintiff was sexually as-
saulted by a guard while she was in custody at the Erie County Hold-
ing Center.76  While the state of New York categorically condemned 
any sexual activity between prisoners and guards, supervisors were 
aware of some history of “consensual” sexual favors being performed 
by prisoners for guards.77  The court explicitly stated that this was not 
a failure-to-train case.78  The court reasoned that based on the law, 
every police officer or jail guard knows that any form of sexual con-
duct with prisoners, unwanted and wanted alike, is unacceptable.79  
This kind of case is one in which there is absolutely no discretion for 
an individual to act in a manner contrary to that dictated by law.80  
The deliberate indifference stems not from a failure to train, but from 
the defendant‟s own failure to establish a policy that would protect 
against the likelihood of sexual contact between guards and prison-
ers.81 
The issue in Cash was whether the entity had a policy consis-
tent with the law to protect their female inmates from sexual contact 
with guards.82  According to the majority of the panel, a reasonable 
jury could have found that once the defendants learned that guards 
were violating an absolute proscription in any respect, the County of 
Erie‟s actions to prevent future violations were deficient.83  In sum, 
the court concluded that a jury could find that “mere reiteration of the 
 
75 654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011). 
76 Id. at 328. 
77 Id. at 329-30. 
78 Id. at 336. 
79 Id. at 336-37. 
80 Cash, 654 F.3d at 336. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 339. 
83 Id. 
11
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proscriptive policy unaccompanied by any proactive steps to minim-
ize the opportunity for exploitation, as for example by prohibiting 
unmonitored one-on-one interactions between guards and prisoners, 
demonstrated deliberate indifference to defendants‟ affirmative duty 
to protect prisoners from sexual exploitation.”84 
Chief Judge Jacobs issued a vehement dissent, arguing that 
the decision was inconsistent with Connick because it was a single-
incident liability case with one sexual assault.85  He argued that the 
previous encounters were not sexual assaults and therefore could not 
have put the institution on notice.86  As with Craig, the decision re-
flects disagreement about whether specific facts give rise to a single-
incident theory of liability, or whether a pattern has been alleged suf-
ficiently to put the entity on notice of a problem.87 
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF SINGLE INCIDENT LIABILITY 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Cases such as Cash involving 
municipal liability can be complicated, but can often be categorized 
as failure to train or failure to supervise cases, or perhaps even both.88  
The question regarding Cash is whether the plaintiff is trying to es-
tablish municipal liability based on the municipality‟s inaction of 
failing to implement a policy.  There are additional cases that dis-
cussed municipal liability such as the leading precedent case in the 
Second Circuit, Walker v. City of New York.89  Officers are not tradi-
tionally trained on moral aspects of the job, such as not lying.90  
However, in Walker, the court said that if officers engage in a pattern 
of lying, that they may need training on not lying.91 
MR. RUDIN: Walker also established the theory that the City 
of New York could be held liable for a pattern of misconduct by 
 
84 Id. 
85 Cash, 654 F.3d at 346 (Jacob, C.J., dissenting). 
86 See id. at 345 (enumerating a parade of horribles that will likely result from holding 
municipalities liable in such situations and arguing that the court would essentially be telling 
police forces and prisons how to do their business, and how to spend their money and what 
policies they should or should not have in place). 
87 See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1312-13 (Cox, J., concurring) (“I am not satisfied that this case 
involves a „single incident.‟  I do not have to count „incidents,‟ however, to conclude that 
Craig has failed to offer proof that can support a finding that there was a custom, policy or 
practice of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”). 
88 See generally Cash, 654 F.3d 324. 
89 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992). 
90 Id. at 295, 299-301. 
91 Id. at 301. 
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prosecutors.92  While Connick rejects that liability may be based upon 
a failure to train prosecutors in their Brady obligations absent a histo-
ry of prior similar misconduct showing a need to train, it was still the 
first Supreme Court case to accept the holding in Walker that a muni-
cipality can be held liable for an unlawful policy under Brady even 
though prosecutors individually would have absolute immunity.93  
With no Justice disagreeing that there could be such liability, Con-
nick essentially lays out a roadmap to establish liability in failure to 
train cases.94 
The problem in Connick is that the jury rejected the alterna-
tive theory of liability of an unlawful Brady disclosure policy, as op-
posed to the theory that the jury found and the Supreme Court re-
viewed, which was a failure-to-train prosecutors in their Brady 
obligations.95  The jury was presented with evidence that the District 
Attorney had an unlawful policy of withholding Brady material, 
which caused the violations in the Thompson prosecution, but the 
jury was not persuaded.96  This meant that the failure-to-train claim 
was the only issue that went up to the Supreme Court on a record that 
had little, if any, evidence of prior violations, similar in kind to those 
in Thompson‟s case, to provide notice of a need for better training.97  
Although Justice Ginsberg‟s dissent argued that there was considera-
ble evidence, ignored by the majority, establishing the indifference of 
the District Attorney to Brady compliance, this evidence related more 
to the rejected unlawful policy claim than to the specific theory be-
fore the Court of whether the District Attorney was indifferent to 
training as the best way to avoid Brady violations.98 
The case law between the decisions in Canton and Connick 
overwhelmingly required, except in a few very narrow circumstances, 
a pattern of prior similar misconduct, as opposed to just a single inci-
dent, to establish a training claim under Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services.99  If Connick had been decided the other way, it would 
have been a departure from the general rule, and would have been a 
 
92 Id. at 300. 
93 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365-66. 
94 Id. at 1365. 
95 Id. at 1377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 1376-77. 
97 Id. at 1361, 1364 (majority opinion). 
98 Compare Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1364, with id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
99 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (concluding that a city is not liable under § 1983 unless a 
municipal “policy or custom” is the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation”). 
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shock, although a shock welcomed by plaintiffs.  It is important to 
remember that, unlike in Cash, the Court in Connick did not address 
other theories of establishing liability besides training, and revealed 
no hostility to them.100  After Connick, a municipality may still be 
held liable for Brady violations based upon proof of an unlawful pol-
icy to violate the law, a history of condoning such violations, or even 
ratification by a policymaker of the specific violation in the case, 
which would be evidence that the violation reflected and was caused 
by the existence of an unlawful policy.101  These are all additional 
theories of Monell liability that are unaffected by the Connick deci-
sion.102 
PROFESSOR BLUM: Custom was not raised in the above 
cases, such as Canton, Brown, and Connick, because in order to show 
custom, there must be a pattern.103 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Furthermore, the difficulty with 
Connick is that it is impossible for a plaintiff to prove what the court 
required.104  The Brady rule in itself is a very intricate and difficult 
concept to master and may require time to understand.  Although 
Brady is taught in schools, it is taught in elective courses, which 
many prosecutors may not take.  Therefore, it cannot be effectively 
stated that training on Brady is unnecessary for prosecutors and all 
lawyers alike.  Case law seems to be stacked very heavily against the 
plaintiff. 
PROFESSOR BLUM: In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,105 the 
 
100 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356 (holding “a district attorney‟s office may not be held 
liable under § 1983 for failure to train based on a single Brady violation”); Cash, 654 F.3d at 
337 (“Accordingly, even if Gallivan had no knowledge of prior sexual assaults, it was hardly 
speculative for a jury to conclude that, at least by 1999, he knew or should have known that 
guards at ECHC and other local correctional facilities were engaging in proscribed sexual 
contact with prisoners . . . .”). 
101 Cash, 654 F.3d at 337. 
102 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366 (concluding that a policymaker‟s failure to train attor-
neys under his supervision did “not fall within the narrow range of „single-incident‟ liabili-
ty . . . necessary to prove deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions alleging failure to train”); 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. 
103 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (noting that a government could not be sued for an injury 
caused by one of its employees unless the injury was caused pursuant to the execution of a 
governmental custom and “may fairly be said to represent official policy”). 
104 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (requiring that defendant show that there was an ob-
vious need to train in order to address Brady based on a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct). 
105 555 U.S. 335 (2009).  Goldstein had been convicted of murder but, after serving twen-
ty-four years of his sentence, his conviction was set aside when it came to light that the 
prosecution had withheld potential impeachment information regarding the critical witness 
against him.  Id. at 339. 
14
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Court makes it very clear that a plaintiff cannot go after the head or 
supervising prosecutor in a district attorney‟s office in his or her in-
dividual capacity for a failure-to-train claim as was done in Walker, 
because the prosecutor will have absolute immunity.106 
MS. KOELEVELD: In addition, the Court in Connick eluci-
dates that a pattern is required to prove municipal liability.107  The 
majority points to there being four Brady reversals in ten years and 
even those did not establish a pattern sufficient to put Connick on no-
tice of misconduct because each incident was distinct.108  The Court 
stated that the issue is notice.109  What would be sufficient notice to a 
municipality that they need to train, discipline, or supervise enough to 
hold them liable?  Likely, this issue of notice will potentially turn on 
whether there is a significant pattern of similar violations signifying 
the need to train, discipline, or supervise.110
  
Finally, the Court in 
Connick suggested that even if a number of Brady violations are 
identified, it would still be difficult to establish municipal liability for 
failing to train prosecutors because Brady violations are so nuanced 
and the specific training required is therefore not obvious.111  Of 
course, it is important for prosecutors to understand, as a general mat-
ter, that evidence favorable to the defense must be turned over, and 
there was no dispute in Connick that the prosecutors had that under-
standing.112  But beyond that general understanding, there are innu-
merable variations in different factual scenarios.  Just as district at-
torney‟s offices cannot be expected to train on every such scenario, a 
municipality should not be held liable because it failed to anticipate 
one particular scenario or another.  Merely pointing to additional 
training that could have been done to avoid a particular constitutional 
violation is not enough to establish municipal liability.  It has to be 
reasonable to expect that training to have occurred. 
 
106 Id.  The Court unanimously held that a district attorney and chief deputy district attor-
ney had absolute immunity as to claims “that the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment 
material due to: (1) a failure properly to train prosecutors, (2) a failure properly to supervise 
prosecutors, or (3) a failure to establish an information system containing potential 
impeachment material about informants.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
107 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 
„ordinarily necessary‟ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to 
train.”). 
111 Id. at 1363. 
112 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
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MR. RUDIN: In New York, and in many jurisdictions else-
where, there have been training programs established for assistant 
district attorneys in individual county district attorney‟s offices con-
cerning Brady compliance.113  Some of the Brady violation cases that 
have been litigated under Monell, before now, involved prosecutions 
that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s before such training pro-
grams went into effect.114  In the future, cases such as Connick, where 
there was no training, are unlikely to be brought successfully.  How-
ever, the question in future cases may be whether the district attor-
ney, regardless of training, can be shown to have been deliberately 
indifferent to, to have condoned, or to have defended illegal conduct, 
thereby revealing an unlawful policy to permit such violations. 
IV. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY – ASHCROFT V. IQBAL AND ITS 
PROGENY 
PROFESSOR BLUM: In a case that was about pleading re-
quirements,115 and a case in which the issue of supervisory liability 
had not been briefed or argued by the parties,116 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for a five-member majority of the Court in Iqbal, changed the 
conversation surrounding, and arguably the standard governing, 
claims of supervisory liability in both Bivens actions117 and § 1983 
 
113 Id. at 1363. 
114 See, e.g., Canton, 489 U.S. at 382 (“Canton shift commanders were not provided with 
any special training . . . to make a determination as to when to summon medical care for an 
injured detainee.”). 
115 There are many scholarly articles addressing the impact of Iqbal on pleading.  See, 
e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011); 
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A 
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010).  For a thoughtful 
criticism of the decision and its ramifications for litigants and judges alike, see McCauley v. 
City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 620, 622-25, 627-29 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting in 
part). 
116 As Justice Souter noted in his dissent, Ashcroft and Mueller had conceded “that a 
supervisor‟s knowledge of a subordinate‟s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate 
indifference to that conduct [were] grounds for Bivens liability.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 691 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  The issue presented on appeal was whether the allegations of the 
complaint were sufficient to state such a claim.  Id. at 690.  “[B]ecause of the concession, 
[the Court has] received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory 
liability . . . .”  Id. at 692. 
117 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of  Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 389, 392, 397 (1971) (holding that an action could be brought against federal law 
enforcement officials for a Fourth Amendment violation; in the absence of a statutory 
16
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cases.118 
In Iqbal, where the underlying constitutional claim alleged 
discriminatory treatment of detainees based on race, religion, or na-
tional origin,119 the Court rejected the argument that high-level super-
visory officials (Ashcroft and Mueller) could be held individually li-
able in a Bivens action based on “mere knowledge of [a] 
subordinate‟s discriminatory purpose.”120  Justice Kennedy held that 
“[i]n a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer 
for the torts of their servants—the term „supervisory liability‟ is a 
misnomer.  Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his 
or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own miscon-
duct.”121  Thus, where plaintiffs allege a claim that requires the show-
ing of discriminatory purpose, plaintiffs must allege and prove that a 
supervisor himself had the impermissible purpose, not just know-
ledge of a subordinate‟s discriminatory purpose, in order to impose 
liability under § 1983 or Bivens.122 
Justice Souter, the author of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom-
bly,123 dissented in Iqbal, writing that the Court is not only limiting 
the scope of supervisory liability, but also completely eliminating it 
in the context of Bivens.124  So, the question is whether there is such a 
thing as supervisory liability after Iqbal, and, if so, how does a plain-
tiff go about proving it? 
The Second Circuit has not spoken to this issue yet,125 but the 
 
remedy against federal officials, the Court implied a remedy based directly on the 
Constitution). 
118 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 692 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“According to the majority, because 
Iqbal concededly cannot recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows that he 
cannot recover under any theory of supervisory liability.”).  The only other case in which the 
Court has addressed the issue of supervisory liability is Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 
(1976), where the Court recognized that the misconduct of the subordinate must be 
“affirmative[ly] link[ed]” to the action or inaction of the supervisor.  Id. at 371. 
119 Former Attorney General, John Ashcroft, and Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Robert Mueller, were among high-ranking officials named by Iqbal in a Bivens 
action complaining of harsh treatment and conditions during his confinement in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.  He claimed that certain 
detainees were selected to be of high interest and treated harshly because of their race, 
religion, or national origin.  Id. at 666, 668-69. 
120 Id. at 677. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
124 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687-88 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
125 See Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 205 n.14 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Iqbal has, of course, 
engendered conflict within our Circuit about the continuing vitality of the supervisory 
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debate circulating in the Second Circuit is about whether and to what 
extent the Colon v. Coughlin126 factors are still viable.127  Colon sets 
out five ways that supervisory liability may be shown,128 but some 
district courts believe that after Iqbal, three of those categories may 
no longer apply.129  Therefore, the two ways that may remain are 
where the supervisor directly participates in the constitutional viola-
tion or where the supervisor implements a policy or custom that vi-
olates the Constitution.130  Some courts have suggested that the other 
methods of establishing supervisory liability based on knowledge and 
acquiescence in underlying constitutional wrongs committed by sub-
ordinates, recklessness, gross negligence, and other similar standards, 
are all in question now.131 
In the wake of Iqbal, there have been few appellate cases with 
extensive discussions of the supervisory liability issue.  The First, 
Third, and Eighth Circuits have suggested that the Supreme Court‟s 
decision may call into question prior circuit law on the standard for 
holding a public official liable for damages under § 1983 on a theory 
of supervisory liability.132  The Third Circuit has decided cases on the 
 
liability test set forth in Colon v. Coughlin. . . .  But the fate of Colon is not properly before 
us . . . .”  (citation omitted)). 
126 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995). 
127 See id. at 873 (setting forth the five ways in which “personal involvement of a 
supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence”). 
128 Id. 
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by 
evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged con-
stitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the viola-
tion through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the de-
fendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional 
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or cus-
tom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates 
who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited delibe-
rate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information 
indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring. 
Id. (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
129 See, e.g., Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 129-30 (D. Conn. 2010); Sash v. 
United States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
130 Sash, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
131 See, e.g., Rivera v. Metro. Transit Auth., 750 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(questioning what remains after Iqbal); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., No. 07 Civ. 
1801(SAS), 2009 WL 1835939, at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (discussing the 
categories of supervisory liability that remain after Iqbal), aff’d, 387 Fed. App‟x 55 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
132 See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 n.1 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court‟s re-
cent pronouncement in Iqbal may further restrict the incidents in which the „failure to super-
vise‟ will result in liability.”); Bayer v. Monroe Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 
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pleadings aspect rather than going into the standards for supervisory 
liability.133  The Eleventh Circuit continues to rely on pre-Iqbal 
precedent that allows for supervisory liability where a supervisor per-
sonally participates in the constitutional violation or where there is a 
causal connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the su-
pervisor‟s action or inaction.134  Many lower courts are parroting the 
language of Iqbal that supervisory liability is a “misnomer,” but are 
continuing to apply pre-Iqbal law until their circuits decide the is-
 
186, 191 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In light of the Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of such personal knowledge, with nothing more, would 
provide a sufficient basis for holding Bahl liable with respect to plaintiffs‟ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims under § 1983.” (citation omitted)); Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 
263, 275 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Some recent language from the Supreme Court may call into 
question our prior circuit law on the standard for holding a public official liable for damages 
under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability.”); see also Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 
1227 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (refusing to “stake out a position” in the debate about Iqbal‟s im-
pact on supervisory liability standard where claim failed even under pre-Iqbal standard); 
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding no plausible super-
visory liability claim stated against administrative correctional officials where plaintiff mere-
ly parroted standard for supervisory liability). 
133 See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“To date, we have refrained from answering the question of whether Iqbal 
eliminated—or at least narrowed the scope of—supervisory liability . . . .”); Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128-34, 130 n.8, 134 n.10 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because we 
hold that Santiago‟s pleadings fail even under our existing supervisory liability test, we need 
not decide whether Iqbal requires us to narrow the scope of that test.”). 
134 See, e.g., Am. Fed‟n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 
1178, 1190 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A supervisor can be held liable for the actions of his subordi-
nates under § 1983 if he personally participates in the act that causes the constitutional viola-
tion or where there is a causal connection between his actions and the constitutional violation 
that his subordinates commit.”); Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“ „It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not lia-
ble . . . for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates‟ unless the „supervisor personally 
participates in the alleged constitutional violation‟ or „there is a causal connection between 
actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.‟ ” (quoting 
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999))); Keating v. City of Miami, 598 
F.3d 753, 763-65 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that the protestors satisfied § 1983‟s pleading re-
quirements for a supervisory liability claim “by alleging a casual connection” between those 
of authority in the Miami Police Department and the acts of the “subordinate officers” who 
followed their direction); Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Supervisory liability lies where the defendant personally participates in the unconstitution-
al conduct or there is a causal connection between such conduct and the defendant‟s ac-
tions.”); Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[S]upervisory liabili-
ty occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional 
violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and 
the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). 
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sue.135 
Circuits that have addressed the issue of supervisory liability 
have stated that deliberate indifference is still a standard that applies 
for supervisory liability where the underlying constitutional standard 
is deliberate indifference.136  Therefore, for example, if there is a 
Fourteenth Amendment medical-needs claim in a prison context, 
where the constitutional standard itself is one of subjective deliberate 
indifference, actual knowledge and a failure to do anything, then if 
that requisite state of mind is demonstrated on the part of the supervi-
sor, there would be supervisory liability in most circuits. 
In Sandra T.E. v. Grindle,137 the Seventh Circuit addressed 
supervisory liability in the context of an interlocutory appeal by a 
school principal who was denied qualified immunity with respect to 
both equal protection and substantive due process claims arising from 
the sexual abuse of female students by a music teacher.138  The court 
noted that after Iqbal, the plaintiff would have to make out a showing 
of intentional discrimination on the equal protection claim to hold the 
supervisor liable.139  Thus, while the court‟s “precedent would have 
previously allowed a plaintiff to recover from a supervisor based on 
that supervisor‟s „deliberate indifference‟ toward a subordinate‟s 
purposeful discrimination, after Iqbal a plaintiff must also show that 
the supervisor possessed the requisite discriminatory intent.”140  The 
court went on to find that there was sufficient evidence from which a 
jury could find that the principal knew about the teacher‟s abuse and 
acted deliberately to cover it up.141  Based on this evidence, “a jury 
could reasonably infer—though it would not be required to infer—
 
135 See, e.g., Steen v. City of Pensacola, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346-48 (N.D. Fla. 2011) 
(acknowledging that courts have “arrived at differing interpretations following the decision 
in Iqbal”). 
136 See, e.g., Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiff 
adequately asserted a deliberate indifference claim), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012); 
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that under § 1983, a 
plaintiff is allowed “to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, 
promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued 
operation of a policy the enforcement” which denies plaintiff of a basic constitutional right); 
Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When a state actor‟s deliberate 
indifference deprives someone of his or her protected liberty interest in bodily integrity, that 
actor violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the actor is a supervisor or subordinate, 
and the actor may be held liable for the resulting harm.”). 
137 599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010). 
138 Id. at 585. 
139 Id. at 588. 
140 Id. (citation omitted). 
141 Id. at 588-89. 
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that [the principal] also had a purpose of discriminating against the 
girls based on their gender.”142  Turning to the substantive due 
process claim, the court found that the plaintiffs‟ allegations were not 
based on a theory of supervisory liability for a failure to act, but ra-
ther were directed at the principal‟s own misconduct in depriving 
them of “their constitutional right to bodily integrity.”143  The plain-
tiffs alleged that the principal “actively conceal[ed] reports of abuse 
and creat[ed] an atmosphere that allowed abuse to flourish.”144  The 
court concluded that “[w]hen a state actor‟s deliberate indifference 
deprives someone of his or her protected liberty interest in bodily in-
tegrity, that actor violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the 
actor is a supervisor or subordinate, and the actor may be held liable 
for the resulting harm.”145 
The most extensive treatment of supervisory liability post-
Iqbal appears in the Tenth Circuit opinion of Dodds v. Richardson.146  
The plaintiff in Dodds sued a county sheriff whom he claimed vio-
lated his constitutional right by being deliberately indifferent to a pol-
icy that disallowed bail set in an arrest warrant to be posted after 
hours or until the arrestee had been arraigned by a judge, which re-
sulted in plaintiff‟s unjustified weekend detention after bail had been 
set.147  The defendant, relying on Iqbal, argued that he could not be 
held liable unless “he personally participated in such a violation with 
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”148  Noting that “[d]efendant‟s 
argument implicates important questions about the continuing vitality 
of supervisory liability under § 1983 after the Supreme Court‟s recent 
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,”149 the court relied on the “causes to be 
subjected” language of § 1983 to conclude that personal involvement 
does not require direct participation in the constitutional violation.150  
The court explained: 
Whatever else can be said about Iqbal, and certain-
 
142 Sandra T.E., 599 F.3d at 589. 
143 Id. at 590. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 591. 
146 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (“Simply put, there‟s no special rule of liability for supervisors.  The test for them 
is the same as the test for everyone else.”). 
147 Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1189. 
148 Id. at 1194. 
149 Id. (citation omitted).  
150 Id. at 1199 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
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ly much can be said, we conclude the following basis 
of § 1983 liability survived it and ultimately resolves 
this case: § 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability 
upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promul-
gates, implements, or in some other way possesses re-
sponsibility for the continued operation of a policy the 
enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or her sub-
ordinates) of which “subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected” that plaintiff “to the deprivation of any 
rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . .”  A plain-
tiff may therefore succeed in a § 1983 suit against a 
defendant-supervisor by demonstrating: (1) the defen-
dant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed 
responsibility for the continued operation of a policy 
that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, 
and (3) acted with the state of mind required to estab-
lish the alleged constitutional deprivation.151 
The court found sufficient evidence to support the first two 
requirements, active maintenance of the policy and causation of the 
constitutional injury,152 and then proceeded to address the question of 
whether the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind required 
to violate plaintiff‟s substantive due process right to post preset bail 
and not be subjected to over detention.153  The court concluded that, 
after Iqbal, a showing of deliberate indifference or knowledge and 
acquiescence would no longer suffice to establish supervisory liabili-
ty “unless that is the same state of mind required for the constitution-
al” violation alleged.154  Because neither party challenged the district 
court‟s determination that deliberate indifference was the applicable 
standard, the Court of Appeals assumed (but did not decide) that “de-
liberate indifference constitutes the requisite state of mind.”155  Sig-
nificantly, the “deliberate indifference” required in Dodds is of the 
subjective or constitutional type, not the Canton statutory or objective 
type.156  In concluding that plaintiff had presented enough facts to 
support the conclusion that the defendant had acted with deliberate 
 
151 Id. (alterations in original). 
152 Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1204. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (emphasis added). 
155 Id. at 1205. 
156 Id. 
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indifference, the court relied on two cases that involved Fourteenth 
Amendment due process violations where plaintiffs were required to 
show that a defendant supervisor had actual subjective knowledge of 
the risk of constitutional injury and disregarded the risk.157 
In Starr v. Baca,158 the plaintiff was a former county jail in-
mate who alleged that he had been beaten by a deputy sheriff while 
other deputies looked on.159  The complaint also alleged that there 
had been numerous incidents in which inmates in county jails had 
been killed or injured because of such conduct on the part of the She-
riff‟s deputies, and that, despite having been given notice of such 
wrongful conduct by his subordinates, the Sheriff did nothing to pro-
tect inmates under his care.160  In evaluating the claim of supervisory 
liability against Sheriff Baca, the court stated: 
We see nothing in Iqbal indicating that the Su-
preme Court intended to overturn longstanding case 
law on deliberate indifference claims against supervi-
sors in conditions of confinement cases.  We also note 
that, to the extent that our sister circuits have con-
fronted this question, they have agreed with our inter-
pretation of Iqbal. . . .   
 
We therefore conclude that a plaintiff may state a 
claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference 
based upon the supervisor‟s knowledge of and ac-
quiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her 
subordinates.161 
In Hydrick v. Hunter,162 on remand from the Supreme Court 
in light of Iqbal,163 the Ninth Circuit panel distinguished the allega-
tions in the complaint in Hydrick from the more factually specific al-
legations in Baca, and found the complaint filed by civilly committed 
persons in a state hospital insufficient under Iqbal to state Fourth and 
First Amendment claims against the supervisory officials of the hos-
 
157 Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1205-06 (citing Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 
2009)); Serna v. Colo. Dep‟t of Corrs., 455 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2006). 
158 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012). 
159 Id. at 1204.  
160 Id. at 1216. 
161 Id. at 1207 (citation omitted). 
162 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012). 
163 Hunter v. Hydrick, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). 
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pital in their individual capacities.164 
Baca was denied rehearing en banc.165  Dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc, Judge O‟Scannlain characterized the ma-
jority‟s application of Iqbal as “Iqbal Lite,” and concluded the fol-
lowing: 
The court‟s ruling today conflicts with Iqbal in its 
statement of the pleading standard, in its application of 
the pleading standard, and in its far-reaching conclu-
sions regarding supervisory liability.  By failing to re-
hear this case en banc, we fail to correct these errors 
and once again must wait for the Supreme Court to do 
so for us.166 
The Supreme Court evidently was not eager to jump back into the is-
sue of supervisory liability and denied the petition for certiorari.167 
 
164 Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 939. 
165 See Starr v. City of L.A., 659 F.3d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A judge of the court 
called for a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc.  A vote was taken, and  a majority of 
the active judges of the court failed to vote for en banc rehearing.”). 
166 Id. at 852, 855 (O‟Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
167 Starr, 659 F.3d 850, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).  A more recent decision by 
the Ninth Circuit, published after this program and as this article was going to print, may 
give the Supreme Court another opportunity to clarify the law on supervisory liability.  In 
OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2012), the court provides a lengthy 
discussion of supervisory liability in a case brought by a student organization against state 
university officials, alleging First Amendment violations resulting from a policy with respect 
to the placement of student newspaper bins.  The court notes that “[p]ut simply, 
constitutional tort liability after Iqbal depends primarily on the requisite mental state for the 
violation alleged,” and that “while a specific intent requirement inheres in claims for 
invidious discrimination, the same requirement does not inhere in claims for free speech 
violations.”  Id. at 1071, 1075.  Judge Ikuta, in dissent, observes: 
In place of personal misconduct and causation, the majority substitutes 
mere knowledge of a lower-ranking employee's misconduct.  But this is 
the very standard Iqbal rejected, because it makes officials responsible 
for lower-ranking employees' misdeeds merely by virtue of the officials' 
positions in the organization.  By adopting this standard, the majority re-
turns us to pre-Iqbal jurisprudence and revives vicarious liability, at least 
for First Amendment claims. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Connick and Iqbal leave many questions unanswered with re-
spect to claims asserting entity and individual liability under § 1983.  
Litigants should pay close attention to the law in their circuits and 
keep a watchful eye for the next case to reach the Supreme Court.  
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court will have to revisit the issue of su-
pervisory liability to clarify the scope of such liability and what stan-
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